I find it very bizarre that during a time of economic upheaval the Globe and Mail is running a series on “Giving.” Is Charity the answer to our economic woes? Some seem to suggest that it might be. For example, Ed Clark, CEO of TD bank (whose salary rose by 9% last year, while inflation is at 3% according to the consumer price index) said:
“We live in a market economy,” which means that paying executives less than the market rate will make it hard to attract the cream of the crop, he [Clark] said.
“Personally what I’ve always said is… what you do with your pay matters. You can solve this problem on how you behave personally in terms of charitable donations and things like that, and try to reconcile that dilemma.” (Source).
Clark believes the problem of CEO pay would be difficult to address directly (by lowering or limiting it), or we would not be able to attract “the cream.”[1] So the solution is for CEOs to act charitably.[2] Again, a similar refrain to the Globe section, I linked to above.
This suggestion seems problematic to me. There is a moral difference between equality achieved through rights (as a matter of what we are owed as persons) and equality achieved through charity (as a matter of the beneficence of others). Immanuel Kant discusses the danger that charity poses to the self-respect and dignity of the recipient in The Metaphysics of Morals. Although I have some quibbles with Kant’s discussion in these sections, I think it is right in the broad outlines.
Kant argues that certain forms of social inequalities might have effects on self-respect by putting some at greater risk of being humbled because of their social position.
When Kant discusses the ways that rich benefactors should behave toward the poor who receive their aid in The Doctrine of Virtue (Part II of The Metaphysics of Morals) he seems uncomfortable with the threat this situation poses to the dignity of the poor. He suggests that rich benefactors “should hardly even regard beneficence as a meritorious duty on his part” and that benefactors “must also avoid any appearance of intending to bind the other by it [the act of charity]” (Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 202; AK 6:453).
Kant argues that although we have an obligation to help the poor, “our favour humbles him making his welfare depend on our generosity” (Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 198; AK 6: 449). In these passages Kant directs his attention to the wealthy and suggests that they should take great care when giving to the poor so that the poor are not humbled by this charity.
I agree with Kant that charity is dangerous because it often requires the recipients to act as humble supplicants. I also find charity to be a problematic way of benefiting others because it allows the wealthy “benefactor” to decide on behalf of the poor which charitable actions are in their interests, rather than allowing the poor to decide for themselves what is in their own interests. Recent research into “defensive helping” demonstrates that this is indeed a dangerous situation, since privileged groups tend to “help” oppressed groups only in ways that perpetuate that very oppression (and in ways that are different than how they would help members of their own group).
My quibble with Kant is that once he recognizes the dangers of charity he pays insufficient attention to these dangers. For example, although he recognizes the injustice of wealth, and that charitable giving creates a morally hazardous situation, he does not require something other than charity to meet the needs of the poor. But receiving need not be humbling. Indeed, recent research shows that many Americans who receive government aid are not even aware that they are receiving this aid, and therefore are not humbled through this receipt of assistance nor do they feel beholden to those who assist them.
Rather than relying on individual charity, which is indeed humbling, we could instead arrange our societies so that we all contribute to each other’s welfare as the result of collective organization. This is not humbling.
[1] I want to leave aside the question of whether this argument about attracting “the cream” has merit, and focus on the charity aspects of the suggestion. I do not, however, believe that CEO salaries need to be as high as they are or rise as much as they do in order to continue to attract “the cream.” I work in the academy, we work really hard and long hours, and professors are often “the cream” of their fields. Yet our salaries (though quite generous) are considerably lower than those of CEOs, and last year our salaries rose at a rate below inflation.
[2] To his credit, Clark has also suggested that the wealthy should pay more in taxes, a suggestion that has landed him in trouble with our prime minister.



For the sake of argument, might not the social arrangement you envision be as humbling? Kant says of charity “our favour humbles him making his welfare depend on our generosity”, which seems right, but what is the difference between that favour, which humbles the impoverished, and the ‘favour’ of a state with liberal social welfare and redistribution policies helping those same impoverished people?
The only point you seem to make in this regard is that “people don’t realise the government is helping them, so it’s not humbling”, but this seems a pretty thin argument.
I mention this not so much because I disagree, but because I’m not sure you’ve provided enough basis for your fundamental point.
Well, Kant addresses that, too. He says that those who depend on the State are not in danger of this kind of humbling in the way that those dependent on private charity are. I believe the distinction breaks down along the active/passive citizen distinction that Kant makes.
The examples of “active” and “passive” citizens that Kant provides are quite interesting. Kant thinks that anyone who is an apprentice to a merchant or artisan depends on the instructor’s will in a way that makes apprentices into passive citizens. If a wood cutter or blacksmith is hired by individual households, then they are passive citizens, but if they “can put the products of [their] work up as goods for sale to the public” then they can achieve the independence of active citizens. Private tutors depend on the will of others and are passive citizens, but public school teachers depend only on the state and so can be active citizens. Domestic servants are passive citizens, but civil servants are active citizens. Sometimes Kant classifies whole categories of people as passive citizens, for example, minors, slaves and “all women” are passive citizens (The Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 92; AK 6:314).
One thing I find interesting about Kant’s list of active and passive citizens is that few of those living under modern corporate-capitalism would count as active citizens in Kant’s view. Most of us in Western society do not own our own businesses or control the means of our own subsistence and instead depend on the private corporations that employ us and produce and sell us our food. Another interesting feature of Kant’s examples is that he does not think dependence on the State limits autonomy, whereas dependence on private individuals does limit autonomy. This seems to imply that those on welfare would have more autonomy than professors teaching at Harvard (a private, non-state university). But it would be too much of a digression to explore what Kant would say about corporate-capitalism.
But you are also right that I did not give enough basis for my point because I had to go teach and decided to publish anyway instead of sending it to my (really long, and never returned to) list of “to publish” posts waiting in queue.
Another quibble I have with Kant is that I think he is wrong that government provision does not humble. Whether government provision humbles depends on the kind of provision and the way we write our social policies. For example, bonuses and incentives for home ownership usually do not humble. Seeking social assistance (welfare) usually does humble since we decided to make it degrading in the 1980s (with Reagan’s fabrication of the “welfare queen” meme).
Thanks for your comment!